"The Patriot Act","Big Brother is Watching You!"

BELOW IS A COPY OF THE PATRIOT ACT THAT WAS PASSED BY CONGRESS IN SEPTEMBER OF 2001. YOU WILL NOTICE
AREAS THAT ARE SO VAGUE AND GRAY IN THEIR WORDING IT SIMPLY PUTS TO DEATH THE CONSTITUTION AND ANY AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO AMERICAN CITIZENS ANY LAW AGENCY MAY ENTER YOUR HOME WITH OUT A WARRANT & MAY TAPE AND MONITOR ANY AND ALL FORMS OF COMMUNICATION WITHOUT ANY JUDICIAL PROCESS. READ IT VERY CLOSELY AS BIG BROTHER USED THE 911 TERRORIST ATTACKS TO INITIATE THIS LEGISLATION. NOT TO PROTECT AMERICANS, BUT TO FURTHER GIVE THE GOVERNMENT MORE INTRUSION INTO ANY SUSPECTED INDIVIDUAL WHO MAY BE DEEMED SUSPICIOUS. IN BIG BROTHER'S EYE, THAT COVERS EVERYBODY AND LEAVES THESE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES VIRTUALLY FREE FROM ANY TYPE OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. THE PATRIOT ACT IN IT'S INTENT IS A GOOD SYSTEM TO COMBAT TERRORISM, BUT THE PROBLEM IS IT WILL BE ABUSED BY CRIMINAL ELEMENTS WITHIN ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.

-----------------------The Patriot Act is now Set in Stone.
--------------------------------------------Big Brother Defeats The Constitution
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------July 22, 2005
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2005 JULY: Following the passage of the House of Representatives’ flawed attempt to reauthorize the Patriot Act on July 20, 2005. Some attribute the London bombings had a spring board effect in the passing of the most intrusive legislation in American history. The passing of these new measures undermines the very freedoms and liberties that define America. House leadership denied members the ability to consider several amendments to the underlying proposal that would have brought the 2001 law in line with the Constitution by restoring proper checks and balances on government power. Flawed from the start, this bill fails to protect our most fundamental freedoms. Instead of allowing a thorough debate on relevant amendments that would help place proper checks against government abuse, the leadership of the House instead pushed forward with a limited set of amendments and refused to allow votes on key amendments that would have restored key checks and balances and helped ensure greater oversight and protection of our civil liberties. Controversial sections of the act do not expire for another five months, and like the initial passage of the Patriot Act, its reauthorization process was rushed and not given the full measure of time for careful consideration of the ramifications of this bill. History shows that the willingness to curtail America’s freedoms during national challenges ultimately leads to regrets about betraying our fundamental values. On July 22, 2005, MSNBC ran a poll concerning security vs. privacy. Over 60% of the MSNBC poll voted they preferred security over their liberties which I myself found staggering. One man stated, " I would rather lose my privacy than be killed by a bomb." My view is some what different. If your under 24 hour surveillance, 24 hours a day by the government, all your records are opened by law enforcement for evaluation which also include your medical history, your financial history, your school records, and even what books you check out at the library are evaluated to look for suspicious patterns, and even your e-mail and Internet surfing habits are being tracked. YOUR A VICTIM OF A TERRORIST ATTACK ALREADY! Terror comes in many forms and the biggest terror of all is a government which monitors all it's citizens and on a whim, can arrest you because you bought a bag of chips that were produced in Iran, a nation known for fanatics and financing terrorist groups. I would rather be blown up in a attack than suffer the upcoming years where citizens are branded with a bar code then put on a leash by the government to restrict their freedoms.

Before the passing of these new provisions of The Patriot Act and the London bombings, two key House committees were considering legislation to authorize the Patriot Act, citing the unwillingness by lawmakers to reject a power grab by the administration and restore proper checks and balances to the anti-terrorism law. The Senate Judiciary Committee is expected to consider similar legislation soon. "Lawmakers had the opportunity to fix what they got wrong the first time, and instead partisan politics prevailed," said Lisa Graves, ACLU Senior Counsel for Legislative Strategy. "The administration is requesting that these sweeping powers remain permanent. As both chambers consider these bills, we hope lawmakers will bring the sun setting provisions, and others, in line with the Constitution by restoring checks and balances on government power." The House Judiciary Committee is considering reauthorizing of the Patriot Act. The flawed base bill would make the Patriot Act permanent and includes minimal, superficial changes. For example, the bill provides a right to counsel to those served with a Section 215 order for medical or other business records, but only a right to counsel to comply with, and not contest, the order. Even the Justice Department has agreed that there needs to be a clear right to consult an attorney to challenge a 215 order. Also, there is no reform of Section 215 to require that there be any facts connecting any American to a foreign terrorist before their personal records, medical, tax, educational records, and any tangible things, are gathered by the government. However, the House Judiciary Committee did adopt an amendment to extend the sunset of Section 215 for 10 years. At the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, despite notification that the hearing would be open to the public, representatives from civil rights organizations and others were literally turned away at the door. The ACLU noted that Department of Justice officials, who are lobbying for a complete reauthorizing and the expansion of the act were allowed to enter the room.

That panel did accept two minor amendments to the underlying bill. Regarding the ability of the government to use "roving wiretaps" the ability to tap any public or private phone linked to a specific target. Committee members approved a "return requirement." That cosmetic change means agents would have to provide notice to the court after the surveillance is completed. Also, the ability of the government to use the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act against so-called "lone wolf" suspects, which was set to sunset at the end of the year, was extended until 2009. Why some individuals consider this a small task to reform The Patriot, it is only another deceptive tool which is lost in translation and could be interrupted in any form by law enforcement officials. In addition, several other amendments that would correct some of the problems with the act were offered and defeated. Among these were an extension of all sunset provisions to a later date and a restriction on the use of Section 215 search orders to obtain library and bookstore records. An amendment offered by ranking member Representative Jane Harman (D-CA), which would adopt many of the carefully calibrated corrections included in the bipartisan Safe Act, was also defeated. The FBI has expanded its ability to conduct surveillance on individuals and groups by forming Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) with the help of local police departments. These task forces give local law enforcement officers access to federal law enforcement files and uses them to conduct surveillance. Despite their recent creation, these task forces already have a track record for intimidating innocent individuals and spying on free speech protected activities. For example, in the months preceding the 2004 Republican and Democratic Conventions, JTTF agents in the Midwest monitored the daily activities of various anti-war and political activists they believed were planning to attend counter-demonstrations, and made "visits" to their homes as well as their friends and family members.

There are several flaws in the Senate proposal. The use of secret orders to search Americans’ personal records would remain in place, with diminished judicial oversight, and with the power still cloaked in secrecy. And, the bill fails to include a short, specific time limit on notification of the use of "sneak and peek" powers. Worse still, the Senate bill contains weak reporting requirements that would keep too much in the dark about how the Patriot Act is being used and possibly abused.
"While none of these bills grossly expands the Patriot Act like legislation adopted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, none of these bills properly brings the Patriot Act in line with the Constitution. It is no accident that freedom of speech is protected in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights: The Constitution's framers believed that freedom of inquiry and liberty of expression were the hallmarks of a democratic society. The First Amendment exists precisely to protect the most offensive and controversial speech from government suppression. Most countries around the world regulate the interception of communications by governments and private individuals and organizations. These controls typically take the form of constitutional provisions protecting the privacy of communications and laws and regulations that implement those requirements. Many countries also regularly invade the privacy of communications or use other methods of electronic surveillance, sometimes in contravention to these same constitutional provisions. The era of a global Orwellian society and the monitoring by Big Brother's GPS technology will soon reduce human beings as a kilobyte of information which will be stowed in a global computer data-base. One has to remember that al~Qaida terrorist attacks were taking place long before the 911 tragedy or the Iraq War such as the 1990 bombing of The World Trade Center and other attacks in Africa, Australia, and Israel.

THE PATRIOT ACT II
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MAY 2004: As House Committee Considers Latest "Patriot 2" Provision, ACLU Urges Congress to Reject Further Expansion of Government Powers Citing widespread concern from across the political spectrum about the Patriot Act’s overly broad definition of terrorism, the American Civil Liberties Union today urged the House Judiciary Committee to reject legislation that would expand the number of crimes eligible for the death penalty. The proposal would essentially make any federal crime currently punishable by more than a year in prison a capital offense if the crime was intended to influence government policy, endangers human life and results in death. This provision originally was included in the draft "Patriot 2" legislation circulated early last year, but never formally introduced. "Congress should be reviewing the worst excesses of the Patriot Act, not expanding it," said Jesselyn McCurdy, an ACLU Legislative Counsel. "Members of Congress should resist any efforts to pass provisions of Patriot Act II piece by piece."

The bill, H.R. 2934, or "Terrorist Penalties Enhancement Act of 2003" was the subject of a subcommittee hearing last month at which the ACLU noted that federal law already provides 20 separate death penalties for serious terrorism crimes, including bombings, hijackings, assassinations and hostage taking. In its testimony, the ACLU said that the Justice Department has not been forthcoming in its disclosures regarding how the Patriot Act has been used so far, and called for Congress to review existing powers before any further expansions are considered. If adopted, the proposed legislation would do two things. First, it would make at least 23 additional crimes eligible for the death penalty. Second, it would create an unprecedented "catch-all" death penalty for any other federal crime punishable by more than a year in prison if it meets the PATRIOT Act’s over broad definition of terrorism and results in death. The concern with the definition of terrorism as enacted in the Patriot Act is that individual protesters and activists from groups including Greenpeace and Operation Rescue could be labeled "terrorists, and if this bill were to pass, they could run the risk of being sentenced to the death penalty if someone dies during the course of their civil disobedience, even if the death was unintended. The ACLU also noted that the proposal could actually hurt America's anti terrorism efforts. Many nations that have abolished the death penalty are unwilling to extradite or provide evidence in federal terrorism cases if the suspect could be subjected to the death penalty as a result of their cooperation with the United States. Suicidal, politically motivated terrorists such as members of Al Qaeda would be unaffected as often they are seeking to create martyrs for their causes and to generate publicity. "This measure, if adopted, will only increase mistrust both at home and abroad of anti terrorism efforts and further isolate America in the world," McCurdy said. "As we set out to make ourselves safer, we must not accept measures that undermine the very freedoms we are trying to protect."

The American Civil Liberties Union and its more than 400,000 members, dedicated to preserving the principles of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, stressed it's concern on H.R. 2934, the “Terrorist Penalties Enhancement Act of 2003.”
The proposed legislation, which expands the death penalty to acts defined by the USA PATRIOT Act as “terrorism” that are federal crimes punishable by more than one year in prison,[1] is one part of a planned sequel to the USA PATRIOT Act commonly known as “Patriot Act 2.” Congress should not consider such an expansion of the USA PATRIOT Act until it has undertaken comprehensive oversight of the federal governments use of the Act and its other law enforcement powers.
The bill's expansion of the federal death penalty would be drastic. In addition to creating twenty three separate new death penalties in one stroke, the bill also creates an unprecedented “catch-all” death penalty for any federal crime, or any attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime, that meets the PATRIOT Act’s over broad definition of terrorism and is punishable by more than one year in prison. Such a drastic expansion of the death penalty will not make America safer from terrorism. Rather, it will undermine international cooperation against terrorism by further complicating efforts to obtain the cooperation of governments that have abolished the death penalty. Adding even more death penalties will not deter suicidal, religiously motivated terrorists who have not been deterred by the twenty federal death penalties for crimes of terrorism already on the books (not to mention other federal and state death penalties that may be available) and may instead simply attract new followers to the cause.

The death penalty is in need of reform, not expansion. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, one hundred thirteen prisoners on death row have now been exonerated. Chronic problems, including inadequate defense counsel and racial disparities, corrupt police and district attorney prosecutors, plague the death penalty system in the United States. With twenty death penalties for federal crimes of terrorism already on the books, prosecutors have ample opportunity to seek the death penalty in serious terrorism cases. The expansion of the death penalty potentially to any federal felony creates an opportunity for more arbitrary application of the death penalty. Continued grassroots controversy among Americans of all political persuasions about the impact of post 9/11 government policies on basic civil liberties has slowed the seemingly inexorable momentum of new federal government powers. Conservative organizations, including the American Conservative Union, Free Congress Foundation and the Gun Owners of America, have joined with the ACLU, the American Library Association and many others to argue that America should not sacrifice its liberties in the name of security. More than 291 local resolutions in thirty nine states, including four state-wide resolutions, have rejected some provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act and other post 9/11 polices that infringe on basic rights and freedoms. Altogether, these communities represent close to 50 million Americans.

As a result, President Bush and Attorney General Ashcroft have not gone forward with a comprehensive sequel to the USA PATRIOT Act , a “Patriot Act 2” that many expected would be introduced last year. Instead, the Administration has endorsed three separate bills expanding federal powers, including this legislation dramatically expanding the federal death penalty.[2]
Congress should firmly reject any effort by the Administration to add new powers to the USA PATRIOT Act until it has received the cooperation of the Department of Justice in comprehensive oversight of its existing federal anti terrorism powers. For this reason alone, Congress should reject this legislation. The Bills Sweeping “Catch-All” Death Penalty Would Greatly Exacerbate the Chilling Impact of an Already Over broad USA PATRIOT Act Definition of “Terrorism” H.R. 2934 seeks to expand the USA PATRIOT Act to create new death penalties for any federal offense punishable by more than one year, if death results. The bills expansion of the federal death penalty would be drastic.

The USA PATRIOT Act, at section 802, provides that any actions, occurring primarily within the United States, are “domestic terrorism” if they (1) “involve” a violation of state or federal criminal law, (2) “appear to be intended” to influence government policy or a civilian population by “intimidation or coercion” and (3) “involve acts dangerous to human life.” 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5). The federal code definition of “international terrorism” is similar, except that the actions must occur primarily outside the United States or “transcend national boundaries” and may involve “violent acts” instead of (or in addition to) “acts dangerous to human life.” 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1). These definitions of “terrorism” are so broad that many legitimately fear they could cover the civil disobedience activities of diverse protest organizations, including Operation Rescue, Greenpeace, and the anti globalization movement. Blocking entrances to abortion clinics, for example, could “involve” violations of federal law punishable by more than one year in prison and may certainly “appear to be intended” to influence government policy or a civilian population by “intimidation or coercion.” Blocking clinics under some circumstances involves “acts dangerous to human life” in that such actions could threaten the lives of the protesters (if protesters block traffic, for example) or interfere with the ability of women to get needed medical treatment. The anti globalization movement is also known for civil disobedience tactics, such as chaining protesters together to block traffic, that could meet the USA PATRIOT Act’s over broad definition of terrorism. Because of the chilling effect of this definition on ideologically diverse protest groups, section 802 is one of the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act that organizations on the left and the right have agreed must be amended to protect civil liberties. Conservative Republican Reps. Butch Otter (ID) and Jeff Flake (AZ) have joined independent Rep. Bernie Sanders (VT) and Democrats such as Rep. John Conyers, Jr. (MI) and Rep. Barney Frank (MA) to introduce H.R. 3352, the Security and Freedom Enhanced (SAFE) Act of 2003. The SAFE Act now has fifty five cosponsors and is pending before this Subcommittee. Section 6 of the SAFE Act reforms the definition of “domestic terrorism” so that it applies only to actions that constitute a “Federal crime of terrorism” under 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). The SAFE Act would thus limit “domestic terrorism” to serious federal crimes, going a long way towards reassuring Americans of all political persuasions that the federal government will not treat them as terrorists because they may be involved in civil disobedience. This narrower definition is strongly supported by groups from the right and left, including the American Conservative Union, Free Congress Foundation, Gun Owners of America and the ACLU.

The proposed legislation goes in exactly the opposite direction by not only leaving in place the USA PATRIOT Act’s definition of terrorism but broadening the definition by adding a potential death sentence. Protest organizations have already been significantly chilled by the USA PATRIOT Act’s definition of some civil disobedience tactics as forms of terrorism. A death penalty based on that definition would multiply the chilling effect dramatically. A few more examples help illustrate why such a “catch-all” death penalty would be so inappropriate:

Example 1. A diverse group of American and foreign protesters at an international population control conference chain themselves together in a parking lot entrance to block access to a local reproductive services clinic in violation of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 248. A woman seeking treatment because of complications from her abortion cannot gain access and the delay in treatment results in her death from those complications. Under this proposal, a federal prosecutor could seek the death penalty against the protesters for “international terrorism,” because their violations of FACE Act were felonies[3] that “transcend[ed] national boundaries” through the involvement of international opponents of abortion, involved “acts dangerous to human life,” appeared to be intended to influence government policy or a civilian population by “intimidation or coercion,” and resulted in death.

Example 2. An organization of gun rights supporters gather at a convention hall to demonstrate against a new federal gun control law that requires all sellers of firearms to be federally licensed dealers and conduct background checks. Some of the demonstrators, saying they want to “send a message to those gun grabbers in Washington,” hold an illegal “gun show” of the kind the law was enacted to prohibit, committing felony violations of the federal gun control regime at 18 U.S.C. § 922. A mentally unbalanced man purchases one of the firearms and uses it to kill a man. Under this proposal, a federal prosecutor could seek the death penalty for “domestic terrorism” against those who participated in the illegal gun show because their violations of the 18 U.S.C. § 922 involved “acts dangerous to human life” and appeared to intended to influence government policy by “intimidation or coercion.”

Congress should not simply adopt, without examination, the list of “Federal crimes of terrorism” as a proxy for crimes that are serious enough to warrant the death penalty. In listing “Federal crimes of terrorism,” Congress did not choose only the most serious terrorism offenses for which it considered the death penalty to be an appropriate punishment, but also included other crimes that Congress created for the goal of preventing and deterring terrorism, including terrorism financing, material support, and computer related offenses. Some of these crimes have been defined very broadly to enable the government to prosecute persons whose actions may have some relationship to terrorism but whose involvement is more peripheral than those who commit bombings, hijackings, murders or other terrorist acts that already carry the death penalty. For example, one crime that currently does not carry the death penalty is the offense of providing “material support” to a designated foreign terrorist organization. This offense was created in 1996 with a maximum sentence of ten years in prison. The USA PATRIOT Act increased the maximum sentence to fifteen years in prison, with a possibility of a life sentence if death results. There remains substantial controversy about the breadth of the “material support” offense because a conviction requires only that the government show the individual “knowingly” gave assistance to an organization designated as a terrorist organization, even if the assistance was only for the organizations lawful activities. The government argues that a defendant may be convicted even if he did not know of the designation, believed the assistance would support only charitable activities, and even if the assistance in fact only benefited charitable activities. One federal appeals court has now ruled the material support statute, as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, must be construed to require knowledge of the designation or of the organizations unlawful activities, and that its prohibitions on providing “training” and “personnel” are void for vagueness.[4] Adding a death sentence to such a broad statute will only contribute to its constitutional flaws.

Congress was certainly aware that creating the crime of material support of the lawful activities of an organization designated as “terrorist” by the government could be vulnerable to challenge under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause. While Congress chose to pass the material support statute despite these concerns, by providing a maximum sentence of fifteen years (or a life sentence if death results), Congress indicated it did not believe this crime was as serious as direct participation in terrorist acts for which it provided the death penalty. While the bill would only permit the death penalty for material support if death results, a prosecutor could be expected to argue that any financial or other contribution to a designated foreign terrorist organization, even for humanitarian activities is fungible and therefore assisted the organization in committing terrorist acts that resulted in death. More following examples help illustrate why it is so wildly inappropriate to make the crime of material support a death eligible offense:

Example 3. Joshua attends a function at a local community center in which he views a graphic film about suicide bombings in Israel. The film praises unofficial “armed resistance” by Jewish militants to Islamic terrorist groups. At the function, Joshua gives money for the “Kahane Chai Relief Fund” for widows of Palestinian attacks. Joshua suspects the charity may be a front, but is angry enough after seeing the film that he does not care. Joshua does not know that Kahane Chai has been designated by the State Department as a foreign terrorist organization.[5] Under this legislation, Joshua’s actions are not only a crime, but he could now be facing the death penalty.

Example 4. Sean is upset about that some Irish leaders have abandoned the goal of a united Ireland and wants to “send a message” by providing technical assistance to an anti British web site. The web site features articles and comments that are strongly nationalist in tone, and Sean has been told the web site is run by the Real IRA, a designated foreign terrorist organization. Under this legislation, Sean would not only face criminal changes, but could face the death penalty.

Supporters of the bill may argue that prosecutors can be expected to exercise discretion and will not seek the death penalty except in very egregious cases. While prosecutorial discretion is an important element of the criminal justice system, prosecutors should not have unlimited discretion. The federal criminal code already contains twenty terrorism crimes, and many other crimes not specifically listed as terrorism crimes, that carry the death penalty and cover a broad range of terrorist acts, including bombings, kidnappings, arson, aircraft hijackings and many others. In very serious terrorism cases, federal prosecutors are likely to have at least one, and probably more than one, death-eligible crime with which to charge a defendant. The bill’s expansion of the death penalty is likely to affect only the more peripheral cases in which prosecutors would not normally seek the death penalty, but where there may be political pressure to do so because the defendants belong to an unpopular religious, ethnic or political group.

Already, many nations that have abolished the death penalty are unwilling to extradite or provide evidence in federal terrorism cases if the death penalty might result from their cooperation. Other nations have become increasingly critical of the United States for its continued and even expanding use of the death penalty when the international trend has been towards abolition. The exoneration of more than one hundred former inmates of Americas death row has not gone unnoticed abroad. Diplomacy concerning the issue of the death penalty has become increasingly tense and complex. The rift between the United States and many of its closest allies is likely to grow even wider as a result of a recent decision of the International Court of Justice concerning the death penalty. The decision strongly rebuked the United States for its disregard of the rights of 51 Mexican nationals on death row to timely consular notification under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.[6] The European Union prohibits the extradition of any criminal suspect facing the death penalty. After the bombing of United States embassies in Africa by Al Qaeda terrorists, Germany only extradited an alleged conspirator to face trial in the United States after negotiating assurances the suspect would not face the death penalty. Many European nations, including the United Kingdom, have restated their opposition to the death penalty after September 11, 2001 and conditioned any extradition's in connection with the global fight against terrorism on similar assurances.[7] By dramatically expanding the number of death eligible offenses, the bill would dramatically multiply the number of cases in which prosecutors will have to negotiate special agreements with foreign governments to obtain needed cooperation in obtaining evidence or extraditing suspects. A dramatic expansion of the death penalty would, according to foreign policy experts, be likely to further impede the cooperation between nations that is absolutely critical to impeding terrorist organizations by arresting and prosecuting their members. Milt Bearden, a former CIA station chief in Pakistan and Sudan, warns, “If the U.S. routinely applies the death penalty to cases of international terrorism targeting American citizens, it may limit continued cooperation from the majority of countries most closely involved in combating terrorism.”[8]

Continuing and pronounced racial disparities in the imposition of the death sentence for serious street crimes has contributed to the harsh international criticism of the United States. A dramatic expansion of the death penalty for crimes said to be terror related, making death eligible many crimes that would not normally carry a death sentence would confirm the suspicions of many in the Arab and Muslim world that the United States is creating a separate, and unequal, system of justice for mainly Arab and Muslim defendants as well as giving Terrorist Groups New “Martyrs” for the Cause and to emulate the “courage” of the “martyr.” Put simply, the most dangerous terrorists do not fear death, they seek it. Even for those who do not participate in suicide attacks, the risks inherent in terrorist activity are far more significant than the possibility that a death sentence would be imposed on any given terrorist suspect. For example, the United Kingdom voted to repeal the death penalty for terrorism in Northern Ireland on the basis that executing terrorists only increases violence and puts soldiers and police at greater risk.
Spain similarly rejected the death penalty as counter productive in its decades long campaign against the Basque terrorist group ETA. Even as the Israeli government continues its controversial tactic of targeted killings of terrorist suspects, its judges do not impose the death penalty on terrorists in Israeli custody.

In conclusion, H.R. 2934 is an drastic and unwise expansion of the governments most sobering power, the power to take a life and imprison those they deem a threat, real.or fabricated. The federal government already has twenty separate death penalties for crimes of terrorism. Terrorists might also face other federal death penalties, or state crimes that carry the death penalty. While the government has not always obtained a death sentence in every terrorism case where it was sought, the reason was because it could not charge or convict the defendant of a capital offense. For example, in the cases involving the 1998 bombings of United States embassies in Africa, the jury found two defendants guilty of death eligible crimes, but chose not to impose a death sentence. The bill is thus a classic example of a solution in search of a problem. Passage of H.R. 2934 would be seen by many organizations of the right and left including anti-abortion and gun rights advocates, as a major and troubling expansion of federal power. Congress should not move a major part of the Administration's agenda to expand the USA PATRIOT Act without far more detailed review of the effect of the Act, and other post 9/11 policies, on civil liberties.

H.R. 2934 will rightly be seen, both in the United States and abroad, as another federal infringement on civil liberties that will not make America safer. It will, as a result, increase mistrust, both at home and abroad, even of legitimate anti terrorism efforts, dividing many Americans from their government and further isolating America in the world. "Just as the Patriot Act was passed with limited debate, the Judiciary Committee has yet to hold any public hearings on this expansion," said Laura W. Murphy, Director of the ACLU’s Washington Legislative Office. "Congress must move slowly before considering any further expansion of government powers. It should fully evaluate the original Patriot Act’s effects on public safety and civil liberties before further reducing judicial review of government wiretapping and taking other steps that reduce government accountability." The new bill, called the "Anti Terrorism Intelligence Tools Improvement Act of 2003" (H.R. 3179), includes many provisions of draft legislation leaked from the Justice Department last year. That bill was roundly criticized by both Republicans and Democrats and never moved beyond a draft. The new proposals would increase the governments powers to secretly obtain personal records without judicial review, limit judicial discretion over the use of secret evidence in criminal cases, eliminate important foreign intelligence wiretapping safeguards and allow the use of secret intelligence wiretaps in civil cases without notice or an opportunity to suppress illegally acquired evidence. The legislation builds on many of the most troubling provisions of the Patriot Act, which passed with minimal debate a mere 45 days after 9/11. To date, more than 300 American communities, encompassing more than 50 million Americans in 40 states, have passed local resolutions asking Congress to revisit the Patriot Act and opposing any further expansion of the law. The American people do not want the government to rush into a feel good security, which is nothing short of propaganda to invoke a false sense of security, as well as the loss of constitutional and civil rights and the elimination of judicial process.

The U.S. Supreme Court, the American Civil Liberties Union is challenging the Bush administration’s legal position that the President has the unilateral authority to define U.S. citizens as "enemy combatants" and detain them indefinitely without charges.
In the consolidated cases of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (03-6696) and Rumsfeld v. Padilla (03-1027) the Justices will today review arguments regarding Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla, two American citizens who have been detained in military brigs for more than two years since their capture or arrest. "Our system of checks and balances was designed to ensure that individual liberty does not rest on the good faith of government officials and to place limits on the exercise of government authority," said Steven R. Shapiro, the National Legal Director of the ACLU. "By contrast, the government’s claim that it can indefinitely detain both U.S. citizens and non-citizens without any meaningful review rests on an assertion of executive power that is virtually boundless."

In the Padilla case, the ACLU has filed court briefs highlighting our nation’s long constitutional tradition favoring civilian justice over military justice except in very limited circumstances. In the Hamdi case, the ACLU’s brief points out that arbitrary executive detention has been seen as inconsistent with the rule of law since at least the Magna Carta. An appeals court in the Padilla case ruled that his military detention exceeded the authority of the executive branch and that U.S. citizens cannot be held at the sole discretion of the President without charges, trial or access to counsel. The appeals court in the Hamdi case found for the government. Yaser Hamdi is an American citizen who was captured by the Northern Alliance while allegedly fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Jose Padilla, an American citizen and onetime Chicago gang member also known as Abdullah al-Muhajir, has been accused of but not charged with plotting to explode a radioactive bomb in the United States. He was arrested in Chicago in May 2002. Both have been detained in military brigs for nearly two years. Neither has been charged, or tried, or until very recently even allowed access to counsel. The sole basis for the detention is the President’s unilateral declaration that they are "enemy combatants." The security of our people depends not only on defending our borders but also on defending the constitutional principles that define us as a nation.

These two individuals, Padilla and Hamdi, are in fact victims of a new upcoming form of martial law regime. Martial law is a territorial form of military control and is enacted when civil order has broken down. The military will invoke it's ideology of law and order upon the citizens and their communities. The laws of current society are handled by elected or appointed officials, whereas martial law is directed by military officers. In Hawaii, martial law was put into motion after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The entire population was under the thumb of a military dictatorship. The coming new martial law, being created by legislation and government agencies that include The Patriot Act and the TIA, will no doubt be used against foreign and domestic society to ensure control and put down anyone who questions the coming One World Government.

AN ACT
To deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) SHORT TITLE- This Act may be cited as the `Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001'. (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS- The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Construction; severability.
TITLE I--ENHANCING DOMESTIC SECURITY AGAINST TERRORISM
Sec. 101. Counterterrorism fund.
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress condemning discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans.
Sec. 103. Increased funding for the technical support center at the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 104. Requests for military assistance to enforce prohibition in certain emergencies.
Sec. 105. Expansion of National Electronic Crime Task Force Initiative.
Sec. 106. Presidential authority.
TITLE II--ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES
Sec. 201. Authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications relating to terrorism.
Sec. 202. Authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications relating to computer fraud and abuse offenses.
Sec. 203. Authority to share criminal investigative information.
Sec. 204. Clarification of intelligence exceptions from limitations on interception and disclosure of wire, oral, and electronic communications.
Sec. 205. Employment of translators by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 206. Roving surveillance authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 207. Duration of FISA surveillance of non-United States persons who are agents of a foreign power.
Sec. 208. Designation of judges.
Sec. 209. Seizure of voice-mail messages pursuant to warrants.
Sec. 210. Scope of subpoenas for records of electronic communications.
Sec. 211. Clarification of scope.
Sec. 212. Emergency disclosure of electronic communications to protect life and limb.
Sec. 213. Authority for delaying notice of the execution of a warrant.
Sec. 214. Pen register and trap and trace authority under FISA.
Sec. 215. Access to records and other items under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Sec. 216. Modification of authorities relating to use of pen registers and trap and trace devices.
Sec. 217. Interception of computer trespasser communications.
Sec. 218. Foreign intelligence information.
Sec. 219. Single-jurisdiction search warrants for terrorism.
Sec. 220. Nationwide service of search warrants for electronic evidence.
Sec. 221. Trade sanctions.
Sec. 222. Assistance to law enforcement agencies.
Sec. 223. Civil liability for certain unauthorized disclosures.
Sec. 224. Sunset.
Sec. 225. Immunity for compliance with FISA wiretap.
TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING ACT OF 2001
Sec. 301. Short title.
Sec. 302. Findings and purposes.
Sec. 303. 4-year congressional review; expedited consideration.
Subtitle A--International Counter Money Laundering and Related Measures
Sec. 311. Special measures for jurisdictions, financial institutions, or international transactions of primary money laundering concern.
Sec. 312. Special due diligence for correspondent accounts and private banking accounts.
Sec. 313. Prohibition on United States correspondent accounts with foreign shell banks.
Sec. 314. Cooperative efforts to deter money laundering.
Sec. 315. Inclusion of foreign corruption offenses as money laundering crimes.
Sec. 316. Anti-terrorist forfeiture protection.
Sec. 317. Long-arm jurisdiction over foreign money launderers.
Sec. 318. Laundering money through a foreign bank.
Sec. 319. Forfeiture of funds in United States interbank accounts.
Sec. 320. Proceeds of foreign crimes.
Sec. 321. Financial institutions specified in subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States code.
Sec. 322. Corporation represented by a fugitive.
Sec. 323. Enforcement of foreign judgments.
Sec. 324. Report and recommendation.
Sec. 325. Concentration accounts at financial institutions.
Sec. 326. Verification of identification.
Sec. 327. Consideration of anti-money laundering record.
Sec. 328. International cooperation on identification of originators of wire transfers.
Sec. 329. Criminal penalties.
Sec. 330. International cooperation in investigations of money laundering, financial crimes, and the finances of terrorist groups.
Subtitle B--Bank Secrecy Act Amendments and Related Improvements
Sec. 351. Amendments relating to reporting of suspicious activities.
Sec. 352. Anti-money laundering programs.
Sec. 353. Penalties for violations of geographic targeting orders and certain recordkeeping requirements, and lengthening effective period of geographic targeting orders.
Sec. 354. Anti-money laundering strategy.
Sec. 355. Authorization to include suspicions of illegal activity in written employment references.
Sec. 356. Reporting of suspicious activities by securities brokers and dealers; investment company study.
Sec. 357. Special report on administration of bank secrecy provisions.
Sec. 358. Bank secrecy provisions and activities of United States intelligence agencies to fight international terrorism.
Sec. 359. Reporting of suspicious activities by underground banking systems.
Sec. 360. Use of authority of United States Executive Directors.
Sec. 361. Financial crimes enforcement network.
Sec. 362. Establishment of highly secure network.
Sec. 363. Increase in civil and criminal penalties for money laundering.
Sec. 364. Uniform protection authority for Federal Reserve facilities.
Sec. 365. Reports relating to coins and currency received in nonfinancial trade or business.
Sec. 366. Efficient use of currency transaction report system.
Subtitle C--Currency Crimes and Protection
Sec. 371. Bulk cash smuggling into or out of the United States.
Sec. 372. Forfeiture in currency reporting cases.
Sec. 373. Illegal money transmitting businesses.
Sec. 374. Counterfeiting domestic currency and obligations.
Sec. 375. Counterfeiting foreign currency and obligations.
Sec. 376. Laundering the proceeds of terrorism.
Sec. 377. Extraterritorial jurisdiction.
TITLE IV--PROTECTING THE BORDER
Subtitle A--Protecting the Northern Border
Sec. 401. Ensuring adequate personnel on the northern border.
Sec. 402. Northern border personnel.
Sec. 403. Access by the Department of State and the INS to certain identifying information in the criminal history records of visa applicants and applicants for admission to the United States.
Sec. 404. Limited authority to pay overtime.
Sec. 405. Report on the integrated automated fingerprint identification system for ports of entry and overseas consular posts.
Subtitle B--Enhanced Immigration Provisions
Sec. 411. Definitions relating to terrorism.
Sec. 412. Mandatory detention of suspected terrorists; habeas corpus; judicial review.
Sec. 413. Multilateral cooperation against terrorists.
Sec. 414. Visa integrity and security.
Sec. 415. Participation of Office of Homeland Security on Entry-Exit Task Force.
Sec. 416. Foreign student monitoring program.
Sec. 417. Machine readable passports.
Sec. 418. Prevention of consulate shopping.
Subtitle C--Preservation of Immigration Benefits for Victims of Terrorism
Sec. 421. Special immigrant status.
Sec. 422. Extension of filing or reentry deadlines.
Sec. 423. Humanitarian relief for certain surviving spouses and children.
Sec. 424. `Age-out' protection for children.
Sec. 425. Temporary administrative relief.
Sec. 426. Evidence of death, disability, or loss of employment.
Sec. 427. No benefits to terrorists or family members of terrorists.
Sec. 428. Definitions.
TITLE V--REMOVING OBSTACLES TO INVESTIGATING TERRORISM
Sec. 501. Attorney General's authority to pay rewards to combat terrorism.
Sec. 502. Secretary of State's authority to pay rewards.
Sec. 503. DNA identification of terrorists and other violent offenders.
Sec. 504. Coordination with law enforcement.
Sec. 505. Miscellaneous national security authorities.
Sec. 506. Extension of Secret Service jurisdiction.
Sec. 507. Disclosure of educational records.
Sec. 508. Disclosure of information from NCES surveys.
TITLE VI--PROVIDING FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORISM, PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS, AND THEIR FAMILIES
Subtitle A--Aid to Families of Public Safety Officers
Sec. 611. Expedited payment for public safety officers involved in the prevention, investigation, rescue, or recovery efforts related to a terrorist attack.
Sec. 612. Technical correction with respect to expedited payments for heroic public safety officers.
Sec. 613. Public safety officers benefit program payment increase.
Sec. 614. Office of Justice programs.
Subtitle B--Amendments to the Victims of Crime Act of 1984
Sec. 621. Crime victims fund.
Sec. 622. Crime victim compensation.
Sec. 623. Crime victim assistance.
Sec. 624. Victims of terrorism.
TITLE VII--INCREASED INFORMATION SHARING FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Sec. 711. Expansion of regional information sharing system to facilitate Federal-State-local law enforcement response related to terrorist attacks.
TITLE VIII--STRENGTHENING THE CRIMINAL LAWS AGAINST TERRORISM
Sec. 801. Terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass transportation systems.
Sec. 802. Definition of domestic terrorism.
Sec. 803. Prohibition against harboring terrorists.
Sec. 804. Jurisdiction over crimes committed at U.S. facilities abroad.
Sec. 805. Material support for terrorism.
Sec. 806. Assets of terrorist organizations.
Sec. 807. Technical clarification relating to provision of material support to terrorism.
Sec. 808. Definition of Federal crime of terrorism.
Sec. 809. No statute of limitation for certain terrorism offenses.
Sec. 810. Alternate maximum penalties for terrorism offenses.
Sec. 811. Penalties for terrorist conspiracies.
Sec. 812. Post-release supervision of terrorists.
Sec. 813. Inclusion of acts of terrorism as racketeering activity.
Sec. 814. Deterrence and prevention of cyberterrorism.
Sec. 815. Additional defense to civil actions relating to preserving records in response to Government requests.
Sec. 816. Development and support of cybersecurity forensic capabilities.
Sec. 817. Expansion of the biological weapons statute.
TITLE IX--IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 901. Responsibilities of Director of Central Intelligence regarding foreign intelligence collected under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 902. Inclusion of international terrorist activities within scope of foreign intelligence under National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 903. Sense of Congress on the establishment and maintenance of intelligence relationships to acquire information on terrorists and terrorist organizations.
Sec. 904. Temporary authority to defer submittal to Congress of reports on intelligence and intelligence-related matters.
Sec. 905. Disclosure to Director of Central Intelligence of foreign intelligence-related information with respect to criminal investigations.
Sec. 906. Foreign terrorist asset tracking center.
Sec. 907. National Virtual Translation Center.
Sec. 908. Training of government officials regarding identification and use of foreign intelligence.
TITLE X--MISCELLANEOUS
Sec. 1001. Review of the department of justice.
Sec. 1002. Sense of congress.
Sec. 1003. Definition of `electronic surveillance'.
Sec. 1004. Venue in money laundering cases.
Sec. 1005. First responders assistance act.
Sec. 1006. Inadmissibility of aliens engaged in money laundering.
Sec. 1007. Authorization of funds for dea police training in south and central asia.
Sec. 1008. Feasibility study on use of biometric identifier scanning system with access to the fbi integrated automated fingerprint identification system at overseas consular posts and points of entry to the United States.
Sec. 1009. Study of access.
Sec. 1010. Temporary authority to contract with local and State governments for performance of security functions at United States military installations.
Sec. 1011. Crimes against charitable americans.
Sec. 1012. Limitation on issuance of hazmat licenses.
Sec. 1013. Expressing the sense of the senate concerning the provision of funding for bioterrorism preparedness and response.
Sec. 1014. Grant program for State and local domestic preparedness support.
Sec. 1015. Expansion and reauthorization of the crime identification technology act for antiterrorism grants to States and localities.
Sec. 1016. Critical infrastructures protection.
SEC. 2. CONSTRUCTION; SEVERABILITY.
Any provision of this Act held to be invalid or unenforceable by its terms, or as applied to any person or circumstance, shall be construed so as to give it the maximum effect permitted by law, unless such holding shall be one of utter invalidity or unenforceability, in which event such provision shall be deemed severable from this Act and shall not affect the remainder thereof or the application of such provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other, dissimilar circumstances.
TITLE I--ENHANCING DOMESTIC SECURITY AGAINST TERRORISM
SEC. 101. COUNTERTERRORISM FUND.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT; AVAILABILITY- There is hereby established in the Treasury of the United States a separate fund to be known as the `Counterterrorism Fund', amounts in which shall remain available without fiscal year limitation--
(1) to reimburse any Department of Justice component for any costs incurred in connection with--
(A) reestablishing the operational capability of an office or facility that has been damaged or destroyed as the result of any domestic or international terrorism incident;
(B) providing support to counter, investigate, or prosecute domestic or international terrorism, including, without limitation, paying rewards in connection with these activities; and
(C) conducting terrorism threat assessments of Federal agencies and their facilities; and
(2) to reimburse any department or agency of the Federal Government for any costs incurred in connection with detaining in foreign countries individuals accused of acts of terrorism that violate the laws of the United States.
(b) NO EFFECT ON PRIOR APPROPRIATIONS- Subsection (a) shall not be construed to affect the amount or availability of any appropriation to the Counterterrorism Fund made before the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARAB AND MUSLIM AMERICANS.
(a) FINDINGS- Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, and Americans from South Asia play a vital role in our Nation and are entitled to nothing less than the full rights of every American.
(2) The acts of violence that have been taken against Arab and Muslim Americans since the September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States should be and are condemned by all Americans who value freedom.
(3) The concept of individual responsibility for wrongdoing is sacrosanct in American society, and applies equally to all religious, racial, and ethnic groups.
(4) When American citizens commit acts of violence against those who are, or are perceived to be, of Arab or Muslim descent, they should be punished to the full extent of the law.
(5) Muslim Americans have become so fearful of harassment that many Muslim women are changing the way they dress to avoid becoming targets.
(6) Many Arab Americans and Muslim Americans have acted heroically during the attacks on the United States, including Mohammed Salman Hamdani, a 23-year-old New Yorker of Pakistani descent, who is believed to have gone to the World Trade Center to offer rescue assistance and is now missing.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS- It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the civil rights and civil liberties of all Americans, including Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, and Americans from South Asia, must be protected, and that every effort must be taken to preserve their safety;
(2) any acts of violence or discrimination against any Americans be condemned; and
(3) the Nation is called upon to recognize the patriotism of fellow citizens from all ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds.
SEC. 103. INCREASED FUNDING FOR THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER AT THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
There are authorized to be appropriated for the Technical Support Center established in section 811 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132) to help meet the demands for activities to combat terrorism and support and enhance the technical support and tactical operations of the FBI, $200,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004.
SEC. 104. REQUESTS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ENFORCE PROHIBITION IN CERTAIN EMERGENCIES.
Section 2332e of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking `2332c' and inserting `2332a'; and
(2) by striking `chemical'.
SEC. 105. EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ELECTRONIC CRIME TASK FORCE INITIATIVE.
The Director of the United States Secret Service shall take appropriate actions to develop a national network of electronic crime task forces, based on the New York Electronic Crimes Task Force model, throughout the United States, for the purpose of preventing, detecting, and investigating various forms of electronic crimes, including potential terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure and financial payment systems.
SEC. 106. PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY.
Section 203 of the International Emergency Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(1)--
(A) at the end of subparagraph (A) (flush to that subparagraph), by striking `; and' and inserting a comma and the following:
`by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;';
(B) in subparagraph (B)--
(i) by inserting `, block during the pendency of an investigation' after `investigate'; and
(ii) by striking `interest;' and inserting `interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and';
(C) by striking `by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States`; and
(D) by inserting at the end the following:
`(C) when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country or foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against the United States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the President may designate from time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.'; and
(2) by inserting at the end the following:
`(c) CLASSIFIED INFORMATION- In any judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the determination was based on classified information (as defined in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act) such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any right to judicial review.'.
TITLE II--ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES
SEC. 201. AUTHORITY TO INTERCEPT WIRE, ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO TERRORISM.
Section 2516(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (p), as so redesignated by section 434(2) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 1274), as paragraph (r); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (p), as so redesignated by section 201(3) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (division C of Public Law 104-208; 110 Stat. 3009-565), the following new paragraph:
`(q) any criminal violation of section 229 (relating to chemical weapons); or sections 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332d, 2339A, or 2339B of this title (relating to terrorism); or'.
SEC. 202. AUTHORITY TO INTERCEPT WIRE, ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE OFFENSES.
Section 2516(1)(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking `and section 1341 (relating to mail fraud),' and inserting `section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), a felony violation of section 1030 (relating to computer fraud and abuse),'.
SEC. 203. AUTHORITY TO SHARE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION.
(a) AUTHORITY TO SHARE GRAND JURY INFORMATION-
(1) IN GENERAL- Rule 6(e)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is amended to read as follows:
`(C)(i) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury may also be made--
`(I) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;
`(II) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury;
`(III) when the disclosure is made by an attorney for the government to another Federal grand jury;
`(IV) when permitted by a court at the request of an attorney for the government, upon a showing that such matters may disclose a violation of state criminal law, to an appropriate official of a state or subdivision of a state for the purpose of enforcing such law; or
`(V) when the matters involve foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)), or foreign intelligence information (as defined in clause (iv) of this subparagraph), to any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties.
`(ii) If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the disclosure shall be made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as the court may direct.
`(iii) Any Federal official to whom information is disclosed pursuant to clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information. Within a reasonable time after such disclosure, an attorney for the government shall file under seal a notice with the court stating the fact that such information was disclosed and the departments, agencies, or entities to which the disclosure was made.
`(iv) In clause (i)(V) of this subparagraph, the term `foreign intelligence information' means--
`(I) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against--
`(aa) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of-a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
`(bb) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or
`(cc) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of foreign power; or
`(II) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to--
`(aa) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
`(bb) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.'.
(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT- Rule 6(e)(3)(D) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is amended by striking `(e)(3)(C)(i)' and inserting `(e)(3)(C)(i)(I)'.
(b) AUTHORITY TO SHARE ELECTRONIC, WIRE, AND ORAL INTERCEPTION INFORMATION-
(1) LAW ENFORCEMENT- Section 2517 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting at the end the following:
`(6) Any investigative or law enforcement officer, or attorney for the Government, who by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such contents to any other Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official to the extent that such contents include foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)), or foreign intelligence information (as defined in subsection (19) of section 2510 of this title), to assist the official who is to receive that information in the performance of his official duties. Any Federal official who receives information pursuant to this provision may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information.'.
(2) DEFINITION- Section 2510 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by--
(A) in paragraph (17), by striking `and' after the semicolon;
(B) in paragraph (18), by striking the period and inserting `; and'; and
(C) by inserting at the end the following:
`(19) `foreign intelligence information' means--
`(A) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against--
`(i) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
`(ii) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or
`(iii) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
`(B) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to--
`(i) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
`(ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.'.
(c) PROCEDURES- The Attorney General shall establish procedures for the disclosure of information pursuant to section 2517(6) and Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that identifies a United States person, as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801)).

(1) IN GENERAL- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be lawful for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)) or foreign intelligence information obtained as part of a criminal investigation to be disclosed to any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his official duties. Any Federal official who receives information pursuant to this provision may use that information only as necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such information.
(2) DEFINITION- In this subsection, the term `foreign intelligence information' means--
(A) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against--
(i) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(ii) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or
(iii) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(B) information, whether or not concerning a United States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to--
(i) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
SEC. 204. CLARIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE EXCEPTIONS FROM LIMITATIONS ON INTERCEPTION AND DISCLOSURE OF WIRE, ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS.
Section 2511(2)(f) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking `this chapter or chapter 121' and inserting `this chapter or chapter 121 or 206 of this title'; and
(2) by striking `wire and oral' and inserting `wire, oral, and electronic'.
SEC. 205. EMPLOYMENT OF TRANSLATORS BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
(a) AUTHORITY- The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is authorized to expedite the employment of personnel as translators to support counterterrorism investigations and operations without regard to applicable Federal personnel requirements and limitations.

(b) SECURITY REQUIREMENTS- The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall establish such security requirements as are necessary for the personnel employed as translators under subsection (a).

(c) REPORT- The Attorney General shall report to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate on--

(1) the number of translators employed by the FBI and other components of the Department of Justice;
(2) any legal or practical impediments to using translators employed by other Federal, State, or local agencies, on a full, part-time, or shared basis; and
(3) the needs of the FBI for specific translation services in certain languages, and recommendations for meeting those needs.
SEC. 206. ROVING SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.
Section 105(c)(2)(B) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)(B)) is amended by inserting `, or in circumstances where the Court finds that the actions of the target of the application may have the effect of thwarting the identification of a specified person, such other persons,' after `specified person'.

SEC. 207. DURATION OF FISA SURVEILLANCE OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS WHO ARE AGENTS OF A FOREIGN POWER.
(a) DURATION -

(1) SURVEILLANCE- Section 105(e)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(e)(1)) is amended by--
(A) inserting `(A)' after `except that'; and
(B) inserting before the period the following: `, and (B) an order under this Act for a surveillance targeted against an agent of a foreign power, as defined in section 101(b)(1)(A) may be for the period specified in the application or for 120 days, whichever is less'.
(2) PHYSICAL SEARCH- Section 304(d)(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1824(d)(1)) is amended by--

(A) striking `forty-five' and inserting `90';
(B) inserting `(A)' after `except that'; and
(C) inserting before the period the following: `, and (B) an order under this section for a physical search targeted against an agent of a foreign power as defined in section 101(b)(1)(A) may be for the period specified in the application or for 120 days, whichever is less'.
(b) EXTENSION-

(1) IN GENERAL- Section 105(d)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(d)(2)) is amended by--
(A) inserting `(A)' after `except that'; and
(B) inserting before the period the following: `, and (B) an extension of an order under this Act for a surveillance targeted against an agent of a foreign power as defined in section 101(b)(1)(A) may be for a period not to exceed 1 year'.
(2) DEFINED TERM- Section 304(d)(2) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1824(d)(2) is amended by inserting after `not a United States person,' the following: `or against an agent of a foreign power as defined in section 101(b)(1)(A),'.
SEC. 208. DESIGNATION OF JUDGES.
Section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) is amended by--

(1) striking `seven district court judges' and inserting `11 district court judges'; and
(2) inserting `of whom no fewer than 3 shall reside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia' after `circuits'.
SEC. 209. SEIZURE OF VOICE-MAIL MESSAGES PURSUANT TO WARRANTS.
Title 18, United States Code, is amended--

(1) in section 2510--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking beginning with `and such' and all that follows through `communication'; and
(B) in paragraph (14), by inserting `wire or' after `transmission of'; and
(2) in subsections (a) and (b) of section 2703--
(A) by striking `CONTENTS OF ELECTRONIC' and inserting `CONTENTS OF WIRE OR ELECTRONIC' each place it appears;
(B) by striking `contents of an electronic' and inserting `contents of a wire or electronic' each place it appears; and
(C) by striking `any electronic' and inserting `any wire or electronic' each place it appears.
SEC. 210. SCOPE OF SUBPOENAS FOR RECORDS OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS.
Section 2703(c)(2) of title 18, United States Code, as redesignated by section 212, is amended--

(1) by striking `entity the name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or identity, and length of service of a subscriber' and inserting the following: `entity the--
`(A) name;
`(B) address;
`(C) local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session times and durations;
`(D) length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized;
`(E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned network address; and
`(F) means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank account number),
of a subscriber'; and

(2) by striking `and the types of services the subscriber or customer utilized,'.
SEC. 211. CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE.
Section 631 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 551) is amended--

(1) in subsection (c)(2)--
(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking `or';
(B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end and inserting `; or'; and
(C) by inserting at the end the following:
`(D) to a government entity as authorized under chapters 119, 121, or 206 of title 18, United States Code, except that such disclosure shall not include records revealing cable subscriber selection of video programming from a cable operator.'; and
(2) in subsection (h), by striking `A governmental entity' and inserting `Except as provided in subsection (c)(2)(D), a governmental entity'.
SEC. 212. EMERGENCY DISCLOSURE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS TO PROTECT LIFE AND LIMB.
(a) DISCLOSURE OF CONTENTS-

(1) IN GENERAL- Section 2702 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(A) by striking the section heading and inserting the following:
`Sec. 2702. Voluntary disclosure of customer communications or records';
(B) in subsection (a)--
(i) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking `and' at the end;
(ii) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking the period and inserting `; and'; and
(iii) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
`(3) a provider of remote computing service or electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications covered by paragraph (1) or (2)) to any governmental entity.';
(C) in subsection (b), by striking `EXCEPTIONS- A person or entity' and inserting `EXCEPTIONS FOR DISCLOSURE OF COMMUNICATIONS- A provider described in subsection (a)';
(D) in subsection (b)(6)--
(i) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking `or';
(ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period and inserting `; or'; and
(iii) by adding after subparagraph (B) the following:
`(C) if the provider reasonably believes that an emergency involving immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure of the information without delay.'; and
(E) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:
`(c) EXCEPTIONS FOR DISCLOSURE OF CUSTOMER RECORDS- A provider described in subsection (a) may divulge a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications covered by subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2))--

`(1) as otherwise authorized in section 2703;
`(2) with the lawful consent of the customer or subscriber;
`(3) as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service;
`(4) to a governmental entity, if the provider reasonably believes that an emergency involving immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person justifies disclosure of the information; or
`(5) to any person other than a governmental entity.'.
(2) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT- The table of sections for chapter 121 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to section 2702 and inserting the following:
`2702. Voluntary disclosure of customer communications or records.'.
(b) REQUIREMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT ACCESS-

(1) IN GENERAL- Section 2703 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(A) by striking the section heading and inserting the following:
`Sec. 2703. Required disclosure of customer communications or records';
(B) in subsection (c) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3);
(C) in subsection (c)(1)--
(i) by striking `(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service may' and inserting `A governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service to';
(ii) by striking `covered by subsection (a) or (b) of this section) to any person other than a governmental entity.
`(B) A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications covered by subsection (a) or (b) of this section) to a governmental entity' and inserting `)';
(iii) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as paragraph (2);
(iv) by redesignating clauses (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) as subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D), respectively;
(v) in subparagraph (D) (as redesignated) by striking the period and inserting `; or'; and
(vi) by inserting after subparagraph (D) (as redesignated) the following:
`(E) seeks information under paragraph (2).'; and
(D) in paragraph (2) (as redesignated) by striking `subparagraph (B)' and insert `paragraph (1)'.
(2) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT- The table of sections for chapter 121 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to section 2703 and inserting the following:
`2703. Required disclosure of customer communications or records.'.
SEC. 213. AUTHORITY FOR DELAYING NOTICE OF THE EXECUTION OF A WARRANT.
Section 3103a of title 18, United States Code, is amended--

(1) by inserting `(a) IN GENERAL- ' before `In addition'; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
`(b) DELAY- With respect to the issuance of any warrant or court order under this section, or any other rule of law, to search for and seize any property or material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation of the laws of the United States, any notice required, or that may be required, to be given may be delayed if--

`(1) the court finds reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the execution of the warrant may have an adverse result (as defined in section 2705);
`(2) the warrant prohibits the seizure of any tangible property, any wire or electronic communication (as defined in section 2510), or, except as expressly provided in chapter 121, any stored wire or electronic information, except where the court finds reasonable necessity for the seizure; and
`(3) the warrant provides for the giving of such notice within a reasonable period of its execution, which period may thereafter be extended by the court for good cause shown.'.
SEC. 214. PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE AUTHORITY UNDER FISA.
(a) APPLICATIONS AND ORDERS- Section 402 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1842) is amended--

(1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking `for any investigation to gather foreign intelligence information or information concerning international terrorism' and inserting `for any investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution';
(2) by amending subsection (c)(2) to read as follows:
`(2) a certification by the applicant that the information likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or is relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.';
(3) by striking subsection (c)(3); and
(4) by amending subsection (d)(2)(A) to read as follows:
`(A) shall specify--
`(i) the identity, if known, of the person who is the subject of the investigation;
`(ii) the identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in whose name is listed the telephone line or other facility to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached or applied;
`(iii) the attributes of the communications to which the order applies, such as the number or other identifier, and, if known, the location of the telephone line or other facility to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached or applied and, in the case of a trap and trace device, the geographic limits of the trap and trace order.'.
(b) AUTHORIZATION DURING EMERGENCIES- Section 403 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1843) is amended--

(1) in subsection (a), by striking `foreign intelligence information or information concerning international terrorism' and inserting `foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or information to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution'; and
(2) in subsection (b)(1), by striking `foreign intelligence information or information concerning international terrorism' and inserting `foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or information to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution'.
SEC. 215. ACCESS TO RECORDS AND OTHER ITEMS UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT.
Title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.) is amended by striking sections 501 through 503 and inserting the following:

`SEC. 501. ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS.
`(a)(1) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a designee of the Director (whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may make an application for an order requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.

`(A) be conducted under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333 (or a successor order); and
`(B) not be conducted of a United States person solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
`(b) Each application under this section--

`(1) shall be made to--
`(A) a judge of the court established by section 103(a); or
`(B) a United States Magistrate Judge under chapter 43 of title 28, United States Code, who is publicly designated by the Chief Justice of the United States to have the power to hear applications and grant orders for the production of tangible things under this section on behalf of a judge of that court; and
`(2) shall specify that the records concerned are sought for an authorized investigation conducted in accordance with subsection (a)(2) to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.
`(c)(1) Upon an application made pursuant to this section, the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as modified, approving the release of records if the judge finds that the application meets the requirements of this section.

`(2) An order under this subsection shall not disclose that it is issued for purposes of an investigation described in subsection (a).

`(d) No person shall disclose to any other person (other than those persons necessary to produce the tangible things under this section) that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained tangible things under this section.

`(e) A person who, in good faith, produces tangible things under an order pursuant to this section shall not be liable to any other person for such production. Such production shall not be deemed to constitute a waiver of any privilege in any other proceeding or context.

`SEC. 502. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.
`(a) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate concerning all requests for the production of tangible things under section 402.

`(b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall provide to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report setting forth with respect to the preceding 6-month period--

`(1) the total number of applications made for orders approving requests for the production of tangible things under section 402; and
`(2) the total number of such orders either granted, modified, or denied.'.
SEC. 216. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO USE OF PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES.
(a) GENERAL LIMITATIONS- Section 3121(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--

(1) by inserting `or trap and trace device' after `pen register';
(2) by inserting `, routing, addressing,' after `dialing'; and
(3) by striking `call processing' and inserting `the processing and transmitting of wire or electronic communications so as not to include the contents of any wire or electronic communications'.
(b) ISSUANCE OF ORDERS-

(1) IN GENERAL- Section 3123(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`(a) IN GENERAL-

`(1) ATTORNEY FOR THE GOVERNMENT- Upon an application made under section 3122(a)(1), the court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device anywhere within the United States, if the court finds that the attorney for the Government has certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. The order, upon service of that order, shall apply to any person or entity providing wire or electronic communication service in the United States whose assistance may facilitate the execution of the order. Whenever such an order is served on any person or entity not specifically named in the order, upon request of such person or entity, the attorney for the Government or law enforcement or investigative officer that is serving the order shall provide written or electronic certification that the order applies to the person or entity being served.
`(2) STATE INVESTIGATIVE OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER- Upon an application made under section 3122(a)(2), the court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device within the jurisdiction of the court, if the court finds that the State law enforcement or investigative officer has certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.
`(3)(A) Where the law enforcement agency implementing an ex parte order under this subsection seeks to do so by installing and using its own pen register or trap and trace device on a packet-switched data network of a provider of electronic communication service to the public, the agency shall ensure that a record will be maintained which will identify--
`(i) any officer or officers who installed the device and any officer or officers who accessed the device to obtain information from the network;
`(ii) the date and time the device was installed, the date and time the device was uninstalled, and the date, time, and duration of each time the device is accessed to obtain information;
`(iii) the configuration of the device at the time of its installation and any subsequent modification thereof; and
`(iv) any information which has been collected by the device.
To the extent that the pen register or trap and trace device can be set automatically to record this information electronically, the record shall be maintained electronically throughout the installation and use of such device.
`(B) The record maintained under subparagraph (A) shall be provided ex parte and under seal to the court which entered the ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of the device within 30 days after termination of the order (including any extensions thereof).'.
(2) CONTENTS OF ORDER- Section 3123(b)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(A) in subparagraph (A)--
(i) by inserting `or other facility' after `telephone line'; and
(ii) by inserting before the semicolon at the end `or applied'; and
(B) by striking subparagraph (C) and inserting the following:
`(C) the attributes of the communications to which the order applies, including the number or other identifier and, if known, the location of the telephone line or other facility to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached or applied, and, in the case of an order authorizing installation and use of a trap and trace device under subsection (a)(2), the geographic limits of the order; and'.
(3) NONDISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS- Section 3123(d)(2) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(A) by inserting `or other facility' after `the line'; and
(B) by striking `, or who has been ordered by the court' and inserting `or applied, or who is obligated by the order'.
(c) DEFINITIONS-

(1) COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION- Section 3127(2) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking subparagraph (A) and inserting the following:
`(A) any district court of the United States (including a magistrate judge of such a court) or any United States court of appeals having jurisdiction over the offense being investigated; or'.
(2) PEN REGISTER- Section 3127(3) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(A) by striking `electronic or other impulses' and all that follows through `is attached' and inserting `dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication'; and
(B) by inserting `or process' after `device' each place it appears.
(3) TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE- Section 3127(4) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(A) by striking `of an instrument' and all that follows through the semicolon and inserting `or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication;'; and
(B) by inserting `or process' after `a device'.
(4) CONFORMING AMENDMENT- Section 3127(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(A) by striking `and'; and
(B) by inserting `, and `contents' after `electronic communication service'.
(5) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT- Section 3124(d) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking `the terms of'.
(6) CONFORMING AMENDMENT- Section 3124(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting `or other facility' after `the appropriate line'.
SEC. 217. INTERCEPTION OF COMPUTER TRESPASSER COMMUNICATIONS.
Chapter 119 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--

(1) in section 2510--
(A) in paragraph (18), by striking `and' at the end;
(B) in paragraph (19), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (19) the following:
`(20) `protected computer' has the meaning set forth in section 1030; and
`(21) `computer trespasser'--
`(A) means a person who accesses a protected computer without authorization and thus has no reasonable expectation of privacy in any communication transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer; and
`(B) does not include a person known by the owner or operator of the protected computer to have an existing contractual relationship with the owner or operator of the protected computer for access to all or part of the protected computer.'; and
(2) in section 2511(2), by inserting at the end the following:
`(i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept the wire or electronic communications of a computer trespasser transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer, if--

`(I) the owner or operator of the protected computer authorizes the interception of the computer trespasser's communications on the protected computer;
`(II) the person acting under color of law is lawfully engaged in an investigation;
`(III) the person acting under color of law has reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of the computer trespasser's communications will be relevant to the investigation; and
`(IV) such interception does not acquire communications other than those transmitted to or from the computer trespasser.'.
SEC. 218. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.
Sections 104(a)(7)(B) and section 303(a)(7)(B) (50 U.S.C. 1804(a)(7)(B) and 1823(a)(7)(B)) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 are each amended by striking `the purpose' and inserting `a significant purpose'.

SEC. 219. SINGLE-JURISDICTION SEARCH WARRANTS FOR TERRORISM.
Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is amended by inserting after `executed' the following: `and (3) in an investigation of domestic terrorism or international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18, United States Code), by a Federal magistrate judge in any district in which activities related to the terrorism may have occurred, for a search of property or for a person within or outside the district'.

SEC. 220. NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF SEARCH WARRANTS FOR ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE.
(a) IN GENERAL- Chapter 121 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--

(1) in section 2703, by striking `under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure' every place it appears and inserting `using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under investigation'; and
(2) in section 2711--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking `and';
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting `; and'; and
(C) by inserting at the end the following:
`(3) the term `court of competent jurisdiction' has the meaning assigned by section 3127, and includes any Federal court within that definition, without geographic limitation.'.
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT- Section 2703(d) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking `described in section 3127(2)(A)'.

SEC. 221. TRADE SANCTIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL- The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-387; 114 Stat. 1549A-67) is amended--

(1) by amending section 904(2)(C) to read as follows:
`(C) used to facilitate the design, development, or production of chemical or biological weapons, missiles, or weapons of mass destruction.';
(2) in section 906(a)(1)--
(A) by inserting `, the Taliban or the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban,' after `Cuba'; and
(B) by inserting `, or in the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban,' after `within such country'; and
(3) in section 906(a)(2), by inserting `, or to any other entity in Syria or North Korea' after `Korea'.
(b) APPLICATION OF THE TRADE SANCTIONS REFORM AND EXPORT ENHANCEMENT ACT- Nothing in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 shall limit the application or scope of any law establishing criminal or civil penalties, including any executive order or regulation promulgated pursuant to such laws (or similar or successor laws), for the unlawful export of any agricultural commodity, medicine, or medical device to--

(1) a foreign organization, group, or person designated pursuant to Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995, as amended;
(2) a Foreign Terrorist Organization pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132);
(3) a foreign organization, group, or person designated pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (September 23, 2001);
(4) any narcotics trafficking entity designated pursuant to Executive Order 12978 (October 21, 1995) or the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Public Law 106-120); or
(5) any foreign organization, group, or persons subject to any restriction for its involvement in weapons of mass destruction or missile proliferation.
SEC. 222. ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.
Nothing in this Act shall impose any additional technical obligation or requirement on a provider of a wire or electronic communication service or other person to furnish facilities or technical assistance. A provider of a wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person who furnishes facilities or technical assistance pursuant to section 216 shall be reasonably compensated for such reasonable expenditures incurred in providing such facilities or assistance.

SEC. 223. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR CERTAIN UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES.
(a) Section 2520 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--

(1) in subsection (a), after `entity', by inserting `, other than the United States,';
(2) by adding at the end the following:
`(f) ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE- If a court or appropriate department or agency determines that the United States or any of its departments or agencies has violated any provision of this chapter, and the court or appropriate department or agency finds that the circumstances surrounding the violation raise serious questions about whether or not an officer or employee of the United States acted willfully or intentionally with respect to the violation, the department or agency shall, upon receipt of a true and correct copy of the decision and findings of the court or appropriate department or agency promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action against the officer or employee is warranted. If the head of the department or agency involved determines that disciplinary action is not warranted, he or she shall notify the Inspector General with jurisdiction over the department or agency concerned and shall provide the Inspector General with the reasons for such determination.'; and

(3) by adding a new subsection (g), as follows:
`(g) IMPROPER DISCLOSURE IS VIOLATION- Any willful disclosure or use by an investigative or law enforcement officer or governmental entity of information beyond the extent permitted by section 2517 is a violation of this chapter for purposes of section 2520(a).

(1) in subsection (a), after `entity', by inserting `, other than the United States,';
(2) by striking subsection (d) and inserting the following:
`(d) ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE- If a court or appropriate department or agency determines that the United States or any of its departments or agencies has violated any provision of this chapter, and the court or appropriate department or agency finds that the circumstances surrounding the violation raise serious questions about whether or not an officer or employee of the United States acted willfully or intentionally with respect to the violation, the department or agency shall, upon receipt of a true and correct copy of the decision and findings of the court or appropriate department or agency promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action against the officer or employee is warranted. If the head of the department or agency involved determines that disciplinary action is not warranted, he or she shall notify the Inspector General with jurisdiction over the department or agency concerned and shall provide the Inspector General with the reasons for such determination.'; and

(3) by adding a new subsection (g), as follows:
`(g) IMPROPER DISCLOSURE- Any willful disclosure of a `record', as that term is defined in section 552a(a) of title 5, United States Code, obtained by an investigative or law enforcement officer, or a governmental entity, pursuant to section 2703 of this title, or from a device installed pursuant to section 3123 or 3125 of this title, that is not a disclosure made in the proper performance of the official functions of the officer or governmental entity making the disclosure, is a violation of this chapter. This provision shall not apply to information previously lawfully disclosed (prior to the commencement of any civil or administrative proceeding under this chapter) to the public by a Federal, State, or local governmental entity or by the plaintiff in a civil action under this chapter.'.

(c)(1) Chapter 121 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

`Sec. 2712. Civil actions against the United States
`(a) IN GENERAL- Any person who is aggrieved by any willful violation of this chapter or of chapter 119 of this title or of sections 106(a), 305(a), or 405(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) may commence an action in United States District Court against the United States to recover money damages. In any such action, if a person who is aggrieved successfully establishes such a violation of this chapter or of chapter 119 of this title or of the above specific provisions of title 50, the Court may assess as damages--

`(1) actual damages, but not less than $10,000, whichever amount is greater; and
`(2) litigation costs, reasonably incurred.
`(b) PROCEDURES- (1) Any action against the United States under this section may be commenced only after a claim is presented to the appropriate department or agency under the procedures of the Federal Tort Claims Act, as set forth in title 28, United States Code. `(2) Any action against the United States under this section shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within 2 years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within 6 months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented. The claim shall accrue on the date upon which the claimant first has a reasonable opportunity to discover the violation.'.

`(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the procedures set forth in section 106(f), 305(g), or 405(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which materials governed by those sections may be reviewed.

`(5) An amount equal to any award against the United States under this section shall be reimbursed by the department or agency concerned to the fund described in section 1304 of title 31, United States Code, out of any appropriation, fund, or other account (excluding any part of such appropriation, fund, or account that is available for the enforcement of any Federal law) that is available for the operating expenses of the department or agency concerned.

`(c) ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE- If a court or appropriate department or agency determines that the United States or any of its departments or agencies has violated any provision of this chapter, and the court or appropriate department or agency finds that the circumstances surrounding the violation raise serious questions about whether or not an officer or employee of the United States acted willfully or intentionally with respect to the possible violation, the department or agency shall, upon receipt of a true and correct copy of the decision and findings of the court or appropriate department or agency promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action against the officer or employee is warranted. If the head of the department or agency involved determines that disciplinary action is not warranted, he or she shall notify the Inspector General with jurisdiction over the department or agency concerned and shall provide the Inspector General with the reasons for such determination.

`(d) EXCLUSIVE REMEDY- Any action against the United States under this subsection shall be the exclusive remedy against the United States for any claims within the purview of this section.

`(e) STAY OF PROCEEDINGS- (1) Upon the motion of the United States, the court shall stay any action commenced under this section if the court determines that civil discovery will adversely affect the ability of the Government to conduct a related investigation or the prosecution of a related criminal case. Such a stay shall toll the limitations periods of paragraph (2) of subsection (b).

`(2) In this subsection, the terms `related criminal case' and `related investigation' mean an actual prosecution or investigation in progress at the time at which the request for the stay or any subsequent motion to lift the stay is made. In determining whether an investigation or a criminal case is related to an action commenced under this section, the court shall consider the degree of similarity between the parties, witnesses, facts, and circumstances involved in the 2 proceedings, without requiring that any one or more factors be identical.

`(3) In requesting a stay under paragraph (1), the Government may, in appropriate cases, submit evidence ex parte in order to avoid disclosing any matter that may adversely affect a related investigation or a related criminal case. If the Government makes such an ex parte submission, the plaintiff shall be given an opportunity to make a submission to the court, not ex parte, and the court may, in its discretion, request further information from either party.'.

(2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 121 is amended to read as follows:

`2712. Civil action against the United States.'.
SEC. 224. SUNSET.
(a) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in subsection (b), this title and the amendments made by this title (other than sections 203(a), 203(c), 205, 208, 210, 211, 213, 216, 219, 221, and 222, and the amendments made by those sections) shall cease to have effect on December 31, 2005.

(b) EXCEPTION- With respect to any particular foreign intelligence investigation that began before the date on which the provisions referred to in subsection (a) cease to have effect, or with respect to any particular offense or potential offense that began or occurred before the date on which such provisions cease to have effect, such provisions shall continue in effect.

SEC. 225. IMMUNITY FOR COMPLIANCE WITH FISA WIRETAP.
Section 105 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805) is amended by inserting after subsection (g) the following:

`(h) No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of a wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person (including any officer, employee, agent, or other specified person thereof) that furnishes any information, facilities, or technical assistance in accordance with a court order or request for emergency assistance under this Act.'.

TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING ACT OF 2001
SEC. 301. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the `International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001'.

(1) money laundering, estimated by the International Monetary Fund to amount to between 2 and 5 percent of global gross domestic product, which is at least $600,000,000,000 annually, provides the financial fuel that permits transnational criminal enterprises to conduct and expand their operations to the detriment of the safety and security of American citizens;
(2) money laundering, and the defects in financial transparency on which money launderers rely, are critical to the financing of global terrorism and the provision of funds for terrorist attacks;
(3) money launderers subvert legitimate financial mechanisms and banking relationships by using them as protective covering for the movement of criminal proceeds and the financing of crime and terrorism, and, by so doing, can threaten the safety of United States citizens and undermine the integrity of United States financial institutions and of the global financial and trading systems upon which prosperity and growth depend;
(4) certain jurisdictions outside of the United States that offer `offshore' banking and related facilities designed to provide anonymity, coupled with weak financial supervisory and enforcement regimes, provide essential tools to disguise ownership and movement of criminal funds, derived from, or used to commit, offenses ranging from narcotics trafficking, terrorism, arms smuggling, and trafficking in human beings, to financial frauds that prey on law-abiding citizens;
(5) transactions involving such offshore jurisdictions make it difficult for law enforcement officials and regulators to follow the trail of money earned by criminals, organized international criminal enterprises, and global terrorist organizations;
(6) correspondent banking facilities are one of the banking mechanisms susceptible in some circumstances to manipulation by foreign banks to permit the laundering of funds by hiding the identity of real parties in interest to financial transactions;
(7) private banking services can be susceptible to manipulation by money launderers, for example corrupt foreign government officials, particularly if those services include the creation of offshore accounts and facilities for large personal funds transfers to channel funds into accounts around the globe;
(8) United States anti-money laundering efforts are impeded by outmoded and inadequate statutory provisions that make investigations, prosecutions, and forfeitures more difficult, particularly in cases in which money laundering involves foreign persons, foreign banks, or foreign countries;
(9) the ability to mount effective counter-measures to international money launderers requires national, as well as bilateral and multilateral action, using tools specially designed for that effort; and
(10) the Basle Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices and the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, of both of which the United States is a member, have each adopted international anti-money laundering principles and recommendations.
(b) PURPOSES- The purposes of this title are--

(1) to increase the strength of United States measures to prevent, detect, and prosecute international money laundering and the financing of terrorism;
(2) to ensure that--
(A) banking transactions and financial relationships and the conduct of such transactions and relationships, do not contravene the purposes of subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, or chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91-508 (84 Stat. 1116), or facilitate the evasion of any such provision; and
(B) the purposes of such provisions of law continue to be fulfilled, and such provisions of law are effectively and efficiently administered;
(3) to strengthen the provisions put into place by the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (18 U.S.C. 981 note), especially with respect to crimes by non-United States nationals and foreign financial institutions;
(4) to provide a clear national mandate for subjecting to special scrutiny those foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions operating outside of the United States, and classes of international transactions or types of accounts that pose particular, identifiable opportunities for criminal abuse;
(5) to provide the Secretary of the Treasury (in this title referred to as the `Secretary') with broad discretion, subject to the safeguards provided by the Administrative Procedure Act under title 5, United States Code, to take measures tailored to the particular money laundering problems presented by specific foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions operating outside of the United States, and classes of international transactions or types of accounts;
(6) to ensure that the employment of such measures by the Secretary permits appropriate opportunity for comment by affected financial institutions;
(7) to provide guidance to domestic financial institutions on particular foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions operating outside of the United States, and classes of international transactions that are of primary money laundering concern to the United States Government;
(8) to ensure that the forfeiture of any assets in connection with the anti-terrorist efforts of the United States permits for adequate challenge consistent with providing due process rights;
(9) to clarify the terms of the safe harbor from civil liability for filing suspicious activity reports;
(10) to strengthen the authority of the Secretary to issue and administer geographic targeting orders, and to clarify that violations of such orders or any other requirement imposed under the authority contained in chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91-508 and subchapters II and III of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, may result in criminal and civil penalties;
(11) to ensure that all appropriate elements of the financial services industry are subject to appropriate requirements to report potential money laundering transactions to proper authorities, and that jurisdictional disputes do not hinder examination of compliance by financial institutions with relevant reporting requirements;
(12) to strengthen the ability of financial institutions to maintain the integrity of their employee population; and
(13) to strengthen measures to prevent the use of the United States financial system for personal gain by corrupt foreign officials and to facilitate the repatriation of any stolen assets to the citizens of countries to whom such assets belong.
SEC. 303. 4-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW; EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION.
(a) IN GENERAL- Effective on and after the first day of fiscal year 2005, the provisions of this title and the amendments made by this title shall terminate if the Congress enacts a joint resolution, the text after the resolving clause of which is as follows: `That provisions of the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, and the amendments made thereby, shall no longer have the force of law.'.

(b) EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION- Any joint resolution submitted pursuant to this section should be considered by the Congress expeditiously. In particular, it shall be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976.

Subtitle A--International Counter Money Laundering and Related Measures
SEC. 311. SPECIAL MEASURES FOR JURISDICTIONS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, OR INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS OF PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN.
(a) IN GENERAL- Subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 5318 the following new section:

`Sec. 5318A. Special measures for jurisdictions, financial institutions, or international transactions of primary money laundering concern
`(a) INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-MONEY LAUNDERING REQUIREMENTS-

`(1) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of the Treasury may require domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to take 1 or more of the special measures described in subsection (b) if the Secretary finds that reasonable grounds exist for concluding that a jurisdiction outside of the United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States, 1 or more classes of transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States, or 1 or more types of accounts is of primary money laundering concern, in accordance with subsection (c).
`(2) FORM OF REQUIREMENT- The special measures described in--
`(A) subsection (b) may be imposed in such sequence or combination as the Secretary shall determine;
`(B) paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (b) may be imposed by regulation, order, or otherwise as permitted by law; and
`(C) subsection (b)(5) may be imposed only by regulation.
`(3) DURATION OF ORDERS; RULEMAKING- Any order by which a special measure described in paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (b) is imposed (other than an order described in section 5326)--
`(A) shall be issued together with a notice of proposed rulemaking relating to the imposition of such special measure; and
`(B) may not remain in effect for more than 120 days, except pursuant to a rule promulgated on or before the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date of issuance of such order.
`(4) PROCESS FOR SELECTING SPECIAL MEASURES- In selecting which special measure or measures to take under this subsection, the Secretary of the Treasury--
`(A) shall consult with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, any other appropriate Federal banking agency, as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the Secretary of State, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the National Credit Union Administration Board, and in the sole discretion of the Secretary, such other agencies and interested parties as the Secretary may find to be appropriate; and
`(B) shall consider--
`(i) whether similar action has been or is being taken by other nations or multilateral groups;
`(ii) whether the imposition of any particular special measure would create a significant competitive disadvantage, including any undue cost or burden associated with compliance, for financial institutions organized or licensed in the United States;
`(iii) the extent to which the action or the timing of the action would have a significant adverse systemic impact on the international payment, clearance, and settlement system, or on legitimate business activities involving the particular jurisdiction, institution, or class of transactions; and
`(iv) the effect of the action on United States national security and foreign policy.
`(5) NO LIMITATION ON OTHER AUTHORITY- This section shall not be construed as superseding or otherwise restricting any other authority granted to the Secretary, or to any other agency, by this subchapter or otherwise.
`(b) SPECIAL MEASURES- The special measures referred to in subsection (a), with respect to a jurisdiction outside of the United States, financial institution operating outside of the United States, class of transaction within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States, or 1 or more types of accounts are as follows:

`(1) RECORDKEEPING AND REPORTING OF CERTAIN FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS-
`(A) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of the Treasury may require any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency to maintain records, file reports, or both, concerning the aggregate amount of transactions, or concerning each transaction, with respect to a jurisdiction outside of the United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States, 1 or more classes of transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States, or 1 or more types of accounts if the Secretary finds any such jurisdiction, institution, or class of transactions to be of primary money laundering concern.
`(B) FORM OF RECORDS AND REPORTS- Such records and reports shall be made and retained at such time, in such manner, and for such period of time, as the Secretary shall determine, and shall include such information as the Secretary may determine, including--
`(i) the identity and address of the participants in a transaction or relationship, including the identity of the originator of any funds transfer;
`(ii) the legal capacity in which a participant in any transaction is acting;
`(iii) the identity of the beneficial owner of the funds involved in any transaction, in accordance with such procedures as the Secretary determines to be reasonable and practicable to obtain and retain the information; and
`(iv) a description of any transaction.
`(2) INFORMATION RELATING TO BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP- In addition to any other requirement under any other provision of law, the Secretary may require any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency to take such steps as the Secretary may determine to be reasonable and practicable to obtain and retain information concerning the beneficial ownership of any account opened or maintained in the United States by a foreign person (other than a foreign entity whose shares are subject to public reporting requirements or are listed and traded on a regulated exchange or trading market), or a representative of such a foreign person, that involves a jurisdiction outside of the United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States, 1 or more classes of transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States, or 1 or more types of accounts if the Secretary finds any such jurisdiction, institution, or transaction or type of account to be of primary money laundering concern.
`(3) INFORMATION RELATING TO CERTAIN PAYABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNTS- If the Secretary finds a jurisdiction outside of the United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating outside of the United States, or 1 or more classes of transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States to be of primary money laundering concern, the Secretary may require any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency that opens or maintains a payable-through account in the United States for a foreign financial institution involving any such jurisdiction or any such financial institution operating outside of the United States, or a payable through account through which any such transaction may be conducted, as a condition of opening or maintaining such account--
`(A) to identify each customer (and representative of such customer) of such financial institution who is permitted to use, or whose transactions are routed through, such payable-through account; and
`(B) to obtain, with respect to each su